# **Basic Model Theory**

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### 1. Structures and First-Order Languages

A structure is a triple

 $\mathfrak{A} = (A, \{R_i: i \in I\}, \{e_j: j \in J\}),\$ 

where *A*, the *domain* or *universe* of  $\mathfrak{A}$ , is a *nonempty* set,  $\{R_i: i \in I\}$  is an indexed family of relations on *A* and  $\{e_j: j \in J\}$  is an indexed set of elements —the *designated elements* of *A*. For each  $i \in I$  there is then a natural number  $\lambda(i)$  —the *degree* of  $R_i$  —such that  $R_i$  is a  $\lambda(i)$ -place relation on *A*, i.e.,  $R_i \subseteq A^{\lambda(i)}$ . This  $\lambda$  may be regarded as a function from *I* to the set  $\omega$  of natural numbers; the pair  $(\lambda, J)$  is called the *type* of **A**. Structures of the same type are said to be *similar*.

Note that since an *n*-place operation  $f: A^n \to A$  can be regarded as an (n+1)-place relation on *A*, algebraic structures containing operations such as groups, rings, vector spaces, etc. may be construed as structures in the above sense.

The *cardinality*  $\|\mathfrak{A}\|$  of a structure  $\mathfrak{A}$  is defined to be the cardinality |A| of its domain A.

The *first-order language*  $\mathscr{L}$  of *type*  $(\lambda, J)$  has the following categories of *basic symbols*:

(i) *individual variables:* a denumerable sequence  $v_0$ ,  $v_1$ ,...;

(ii) *predicate symbols*: for each  $i \in I$ , a predicate symbol  $P_i$  of degree  $\lambda(i)$ ;

(iii) *individual constants*: for each  $j \in J$  an individual constant  $c_j$ ;

(iv) *equality symbol*: the symbol =;

(v) *logical operators:*  $\neg$  (negation),  $\land$  (conjunction);

(vi) *existential quantifier symbol*: ∃ ("there exists");

(vii) punctuation symbols: e.g. (), [].

Predicate and constant symbols are often called *extralogical* symbols; variables and constants are collectively known as *terms:* we shall use symbols *t*, *u*, possibly with subscripts, to denote arbitrary terms.

Atomic formulas of  $\mathscr{D}$  are finite strings of basic symbols of either of the forms  $P_i t_{1...t_{\lambda(i)}}$ or t = u, where  $t_1, ..., t_{\lambda(i)}$ , t, u are terms. Formulas of  $\mathscr{L}$  (or  $\mathscr{L}$ -formulas) are finite strings of basic symbols defined in the following recursive manner:

(a) any atomic formula is a formula;

(b) if  $\varphi$ ,  $\psi$  are formulas, so also are  $\neg \varphi$ ,  $\varphi \land \psi$ , and  $\exists x \varphi$ , where *x* is any variable *v<sub>n</sub>*;

(c) a finite string of symbols is a formula exactly when it follows from finitely many applications of (a) and (b) that it is one.

We write  $Form(\mathscr{D})$  for the set of all formulas of  $\mathscr{D}$ . The degree (of complexity) of a formula is

defined to be the number of occurrences of logical operators and quantifiers in it.

The symbols  $\lor$  (disjunction),  $\rightarrow$  (implication) and  $\forall$  (universal quantifier) are introduced as *abbreviations*:

$$\begin{array}{c} \varphi \lor \psi \quad \text{for } \neg(\neg \varphi \land \neg \psi) \\ \varphi \rightarrow \psi \quad \text{for } \neg \varphi \lor \psi \\ \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi \quad \text{for } (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \land (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \\ \forall x \varphi \quad \text{for } \neg \exists x \neg \varphi. \end{array}$$

We also write  $\bigwedge_{i=1}^{n} \varphi_i$  for  $\varphi_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge \varphi_n$ .

It will be assumed that the notions of *free* and *bound* occurrence of a variable in a formula are understood. We write  $\varphi(v_0, ..., v_n)$  to indicate that the free variables of  $\varphi$  are among  $v_0, ..., v_n$ . We also write  $\varphi(x/t)$ , or simply  $\varphi(t)$ , for the result of substituting *t* at each free occurrence of *x* in  $\varphi$ . More generally, we write  $\varphi(t_0, ..., t_n)$  for the result of substituting  $t_i$  at each occurrence of  $v_i$ , for i = 0, ..., n, in  $\varphi(v_0, ..., v_n)$ . An  $\mathscr{L}$ -sentence is an  $\mathscr{L}$ -formula without free variables. We write Sent( $\mathscr{L}$ ) for the set of all  $\mathscr{L}$ -sentences.

The *cardinality*  $||\mathscr{L}||$  of  $\mathscr{L}$  is defined to be the cardinality of its set of basic symbols.

Lemma.  $\|\mathscr{L}\| = |Form(\mathscr{L})|$ .

**Proof.** Let  $||\mathscr{L}|| = \kappa$ . Since  $\kappa$  is infinite and each formula is a finite string of symbols,  $|Form(\mathscr{L})| \leq \kappa$ . The fact that  $\kappa$  is infinite also implies that either the set of terms or the set of predicate symbols of  $\mathscr{L}$  (or both) must have cardinality  $\kappa$ . In either case the set of atomic formulas of the form  $P_{it...t}$  has cardinality  $\kappa$ , so that  $|Form(\mathscr{L})| \geq \kappa$ . The Lemma follows.

For  $\Sigma \subseteq Sent(\mathscr{D})$  we define  $\mathscr{D}_{\Sigma}$  to be the language whose extralogical symbols are precisely those occurring in at least one sentence of  $\Sigma$ .

**Lemma.**  $\|\mathscr{L}_{\Sigma}\| = \max(\aleph_0, |\Sigma|).$ 

**Proof.** If  $\Sigma$  is finite, evidently  $||\mathscr{L}_{\Sigma}|| = \aleph_0$ . Now suppose that  $|\Sigma| = \kappa \ge \aleph_0$ . We have  $|\Sigma| \le Form(\mathscr{L}_{\Sigma})| = ||\mathscr{L}_{\Sigma}||$  by the previous lemma. For each  $\sigma \in \Sigma$  let  $S(\sigma)$  be the set of  $(\mathscr{L}_{\Sigma})$  symbols occurring in  $\sigma$ : then  $S(\sigma)$  is finite. Also the set *K* of terms of  $\mathscr{L}_{\Sigma}$  is included in the union of the sets  $S(\sigma)$  for  $\sigma \in \Sigma$ , so that

$$|K| \leq |\bigcup \{S(\sigma): \sigma \in \Sigma\}| \leq \sum_{\sigma \in \Sigma} |S(\sigma)| \leq |\Sigma| \cdot \aleph_0 = |\Sigma|.$$

Thus  $||\mathscr{L}_{\Sigma}|| \le |K| + \aleph_0 + \aleph_0 \le |\Sigma|$ , and hence  $||\mathscr{L}_{\Sigma}|| = |\Sigma|$  as required.

## 2. Satisfaction, validity, and models.

If  $\mathscr{D}$  is a first-order language, a structure having the same type as that of  $\mathscr{D}$  is called an  $\mathscr{D}$ -

*structure*. Let  $\mathfrak{A} = (A, \{R_i: i \in I\}, \{e_j: j \in J\})$  be an  $\mathscr{L}$ -structure, where  $\mathscr{L}$  has type  $(\lambda, J)$ , and let  $a = (a_0, a_1, ...)$  be a countable sequence of elements of A (such a sequence will be referred to henceforth as an *A*-sequence). For any predicate symbol or term of  $\mathscr{L}$ , we define its *interpretation under*  $(\mathfrak{A}, \mathbf{a})$  as follows:

$$P_i^{(\mathfrak{A},a)} = R_i \quad c_j^{(\mathfrak{A},a)} = e_j \quad v_n^{(\mathfrak{A},a)} = a_n.$$

Since  $P_i^{(\mathfrak{A},a)}$  and  $c_j^{(\mathfrak{A},a)}$  depend only on  $\mathfrak{A}$ , we usually just write  $P_i^{\mathfrak{A}}$  and  $c_j^{\mathfrak{A}}$  for these and call them the *interpretations* of  $P_i$  and  $c_j$ , respectively, *in*  $\mathfrak{A}$ .

For  $n \in \omega$ ,  $b \in A$  we define

 $[n|b]\mathbf{a} = (a_0, a_1, ..., a_{n-1}, b, a_{n+1}, ...).$ For  $\varphi \in Form(\mathscr{D})$  we define the relation  $\mathbf{a}$  satisfies  $\varphi$  in  $\mathfrak{A}$ , written

 $\mathfrak{A} \models_a \varphi$ ,

recursively on the degree of  $\phi$  as follows:

1) for terms t, u,

$$\mathfrak{A}\models_a t=u \iff t^{(\mathfrak{A},a)}=u^{(\mathfrak{A},a)};$$

2) for terms  $t_1$ ,...,  $t_{\lambda(i)}$ ,

$$\mathfrak{A} \vDash_{a} P_{i}t_{1}...t_{\lambda(i)} \Leftrightarrow R_{i}(t_{1}^{(\mathfrak{A},a)}, ..., t_{\lambda(i)}^{(\mathfrak{A},a)});$$

- 3)  $\mathfrak{A} \vDash_{a} \neg \phi \Leftrightarrow \operatorname{not} \mathfrak{A} \vDash_{a} \phi;$
- 4)  $\mathfrak{A} \vDash_{a} \varphi \land \psi \Leftrightarrow \mathfrak{A} \vDash_{a} \varphi$  and  $\mathfrak{A} \vDash_{a} \psi$ ,
- 5)  $\mathfrak{A} \vDash_{a} \exists v_{n} \varphi \Leftrightarrow \text{ for some } b \in A, \mathfrak{A} \vDash_{[n \mid b]a} \varphi.$

The following facts are then easily established:

(a)  $\mathfrak{A} \vDash_{a} \forall v_{n} \varphi \Leftrightarrow \text{ for all } b \in A, \mathfrak{A} \vDash_{[n|b]a} \varphi;$ 

(b) suppose that *a*, *b* are *A*-sequences such that  $a_n = b_n$  whenever  $v_n$  occurs free in  $\varphi$ . Then

$$\mathfrak{A}\vDash_a \phi \Leftrightarrow \mathfrak{A}\vDash_b \phi$$

In view of fact (b), the truth of  $\mathfrak{A} \models_a \varphi$  depends only on the interpretations under  $(\mathfrak{A}, a)$  of the free variables of  $\varphi$ , that is, if these are among  $v_0, ..., v_n$ , only on  $a_0, ..., a_n$ . Accordingly, under these conditions we shall often write

$$\mathfrak{A} \models_{a} \varphi[a_0, ..., a_n]$$
 for  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{a} \varphi$ .

We say that a formula  $\varphi$  is *valid* in  $\mathfrak{A}$  if  $\mathfrak{A} \models_a \varphi$  for *every A*-sequence *a* and *satisfiable* in  $\mathfrak{A}$  if  $\mathfrak{A} \models_a \varphi$  for *some A*-sequence *a*. It follows from (b) above that a sentence  $\sigma$  is satisfiable in a given structure iff it is valid there. If  $\sigma$  is valid in  $\mathfrak{A}$  we write

 $\mathfrak{A} \models_a \varphi$ 

and say that  $\mathfrak{A}$  is a model of  $\sigma$ , or that  $\sigma$  holds in  $\mathfrak{A}$ . If  $\Sigma \subseteq Sent(\mathscr{D})$ , we say that  $\mathfrak{A}$  is a model of  $\Sigma$ , and write

 $\mathfrak{A} \models \Sigma$ ,

if  $\mathfrak{A}$  is a model of each member of  $\Sigma$ . If  $\varphi \in Form(\mathscr{D})$ , we say that  $\Sigma$  *logically entails*  $\varphi$ , and write

$$\Sigma \vDash \varphi$$
,

if  $\varphi$  is valid in every model of  $\Sigma$ . In particular, we write

 $\models \varphi$ 

for  $\emptyset \vDash \varphi$ ; a formula  $\varphi$  satisfying this condition is then valid in every (*L*-) structure and is called *universally valid*.

Let  $\mathscr{D}$  \* be a language which is an *extension* of  $\mathscr{D}$ , i.e. obtained from  $\mathscr{D}$  by adding a set  $\{P_i: i \in I^*\}$  of new predicate symbols and a set  $\{c_j: j \in J^*\}$  of new constant symbols. Given an  $\mathscr{D}^*$ -structure

$$\mathfrak{A}^* = (A, \{R_i: i \in I \cup I^*\}, \{e_j: j \in J \cup J^*\}),\$$

the *L*-structure

 $\mathfrak{A} = (A, \{R_i: i \in I\}, \{e_j: j \in J\})$ 

is called the  $\mathscr{D}$ -reduction of  $\mathfrak{A}^*$ . Analogously,  $\mathfrak{A}^*$  is called an  $\mathscr{D}^*$ -expansion of  $\mathfrak{A}$ . Notice that, while an  $\mathscr{D}^*$ -structure always has a unique  $\mathscr{D}$ -reduction, an  $\mathscr{D}$ -structure has in general more than one  $\mathscr{D}^*$ -expansion. We write  $\mathfrak{A}^*|\mathscr{D}$  for the  $\mathscr{D}$ -reduction of  $\mathfrak{A}^*$ . It is important to keep in mind the fact that expanding or reducing has no effect on the domain of a structure; these operations merely add or subtract relations and designated elements.

The following lemmas are routine. The first is proved by a straightforward induction on the degree of complexity of formulas, the second follows from the definition of  $\models$ .

**Expansion lemma.** Let  $\Sigma \subseteq Sent(\mathscr{G})$ , let  $\mathscr{D}^*$  be any extension of  $\mathscr{D}$ , let  $\mathfrak{A}$  be any  $\mathscr{D}^-$  structure, and let  $\mathfrak{A}^*$  be any  $\mathscr{D}^*$ -expansion of  $\mathfrak{A}$ . Then

$$\mathfrak{A}\models\Sigma\iff\mathfrak{A}^*\models\Sigma$$
.

**Constants lemma.** Let  $\mathfrak{A}$  be an  $\mathscr{L}$ -structure, let  $\varphi(v_0, ..., v_n) \in Form(\mathscr{L})$ , and let  $c_0, ..., c_n$  be constant symbols of  $\mathscr{L}$ . Then

 $\mathfrak{A} \models \varphi(c_0, ..., c_n) \Leftrightarrow \mathfrak{A} \models \varphi[c_0^{\mathfrak{A}}, ..., c_n^{\mathfrak{A}}]. \blacksquare$ 

### 3. Review of first-order predicate logic.

Let  $\mathscr{D}$  be a first-order language of type  $(\lambda, J)$ . We specify *axioms* and *rules of inference* for  $\mathscr{D}$  as follows. As *axioms* we take

1) all instances of propositional tautologies;

2) equality axioms:

$$t = t \quad t = u \rightarrow u = t \quad t = u \land u = v \rightarrow t = v$$

$$(t_1 = u_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge t_{\lambda(i)} = u_{\lambda(i)}) \rightarrow [P_i t_1 \ldots t_{\lambda(i)} \rightarrow P_i u_1 \ldots u_{\lambda(i)}]$$

3) all formulas of the form

 $\forall x \varphi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(t) \qquad \varphi(t) \rightarrow \exists x \varphi(x)$ 

where, if *t* is a variable, it does not occur bound in  $\varphi$ .

The *rules of inference* of *L* are:

1) modus ponens:

$$\begin{array}{cc} \phi & \phi \to \psi \\ \psi \end{array}$$

2) *quantifier rules*: if x is not free in  $\varphi$ ,

 $\begin{array}{cc} \underline{\phi \to \psi(x)} & \underline{\psi(x) \to \phi} \\ \phi \to \forall x \phi(x) & \exists x \psi(x) \to \phi \end{array}$ 

A *proof* in  $\mathscr{D}$  of  $\varphi$  from a set  $\Sigma \subseteq Sent(\mathscr{D})$  is a finite sequence  $\psi_1, ..., \psi_n$  of  $\mathscr{D}$ -formulas, with  $\psi_n = \varphi$ , each member of which is either an axiom, a member of  $\Sigma$ , or else follows from previous  $\psi_i$  by one of the rules of inference. We say that  $\varphi$  is *provable from*  $\Sigma$ , and write

 $\Sigma \vdash \varphi$ ,

if there is a proof of  $\varphi$  from  $\Sigma$ .  $\Sigma$  is said to be *consistent* (in  $\mathscr{D}$ ) if for no  $\mathscr{D}$ -formula  $\varphi$  do we have  $\Sigma \vdash \varphi \land \neg \varphi$ . If  $\varnothing \vdash \varphi$ , we write  $\vdash \varphi$  and say that  $\varphi$  is a *theorem* of  $\mathscr{D}$ .

We now list a number of basic results concerning these notions. Throughout,  $\Sigma$  denotes an arbitrary set of  $\mathscr{D}$ -sentences.

**Quantifier lemma**. If x does not occur free in  $\varphi$ , then

 $\Sigma \vdash \exists x(\phi \land \psi) \leftrightarrow (\phi \land \exists x\psi) \qquad \Sigma \vdash \exists x(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \leftrightarrow (\phi \rightarrow \exists x\psi). \blacksquare$ 

**Deduction theorem.** If  $\sigma \in Sent(\mathscr{G})$ , then for any formula  $\varphi$ ,  $\Sigma \cup \{\sigma\} \vdash \varphi \Leftrightarrow \Sigma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi$ .

**Finiteness theorem**. If  $\Sigma \vdash \varphi$ , then  $\Sigma_0 \vdash \varphi$  for some finite subset  $\Sigma_0$  of  $\Sigma$ .

**Soundness theorem.** If  $\Sigma \vdash \varphi$ , then  $\Sigma \models \varphi$ .

**Consistency lemma.** (i)  $\Sigma$  is consistent iff  $\Sigma \nvDash \varphi$  not for some  $\mathscr{D}$ -formula  $\varphi$ . (ii)  $\Sigma$  is consistent iff every finite subset of  $\Sigma$  is so. (iii) If  $\sigma \in Sent(\mathscr{D}), \Sigma \cup \{\sigma\}$  is consistent iff  $\Sigma \nvDash \neg \sigma$ .

**Generalization lemma.** If  $\varphi(v_0, ..., v_n) \in Form(\mathscr{D})$ , then  $\Sigma \vdash \varphi \implies \Sigma \vdash \forall v_0 ... \forall v_n \varphi$ .

# 4. The completeness and model existence theorems and some of their consequences.

Let  $\mathscr{D}$  be a first-order language of type ( $\lambda$ , J). We make the following definitions.

1. An extension  $\mathscr{D}^*$  of  $\mathscr{D}$  is called a *simple* extension of  $\mathscr{D}$  if it is obtained by adding just new constant symbols.

3. A set  $\Sigma \subseteq Sent(\mathcal{G})$  is *saturated* if for any  $\mathcal{G}$ -formula  $\varphi$  with at most one free variable *x*, there is a constant *c* of  $\mathcal{G}$  for which

$$\Sigma \vdash \exists x \varphi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(c).$$

If  $\Sigma$  is saturated, then clearly:

 $\Sigma \vdash \exists x \varphi(x) \Leftrightarrow \Sigma \vdash \varphi(c)$  for some constant *c* of *L*.

Notice also that if some set of  $\mathscr{D}$ -sentences is saturated, then  $\mathscr{D}$  contains at least one constant symbol.

**Lemma 1.** Suppose that  $\Sigma \subseteq Sent(\mathscr{G})$  is consistent. Then there is a consistent  $\mathscr{G}$ -saturated extension  $\Sigma^*$  in a simple extension  $\mathscr{G}^*$  of  $\mathscr{G}$  for which  $||\mathscr{G}^*|| = ||\mathscr{G}||$ .

**Proof.** Let *F* be the set of  $\mathscr{P}$ -formulas with at most one free variable (which we shall denote by *x*). For each  $\varphi \in F$  introduce a new constant symbol  $c_{\varphi}$  in such a way that, if  $\varphi$  and  $\psi$  are distinct formulas, then  $c_{\varphi}$  and  $c_{\psi}$  are distinct constants. In this way we obtain a simple extension  $\mathscr{D}^*$  of  $\mathscr{D}$  clearly  $||\mathscr{D}^*|| = ||\mathscr{D}||$ .

Now define

$$\Sigma^* = \Sigma \cup \{\exists x \phi(x) \to \phi(c_{\varphi}) \colon \varphi \in F\}.$$

Clearly  $\Sigma^*$  is an  $\mathscr{L}$ -saturated extension of  $\Sigma$  in  $\mathscr{L}^*$ . It remains to show that  $\Sigma^*$  is consistent.

Suppose, on the contrary, that  $\Sigma^*$  is inconsistent. Then by the consistency lemma there is a finite subset  $\{\varphi_1,...,\varphi_n\}$  of *F* such that, writing  $c_i$  for  $c_{\varphi_i}, \Sigma \cup \{\exists x \varphi_i \rightarrow \varphi_i(c_i): i = 1,..., n\}$  is inconsistent. It follows from the consistency lemma that

(\*) 
$$\Sigma \vdash \neg \bigwedge_{i=1}^{n} [\exists x \varphi_{i} \to \varphi_{i}(c_{i})]$$

Now choose *n* distinct variables  $x_1, ..., x_n$  which do not occur in the proof from  $\Sigma$  of the sentence on the right hand side of the turnstile in (\*). If in this proof we change  $c_i$  at each of its occurrences to  $x_i$  for i = 1, ..., n, we obtain a proof of the formula  $\neg \bigwedge_{i=1}^{n} [\exists x \varphi_i \rightarrow \varphi_i(x_i)]$  from  $\Sigma$ , whence

$$\Sigma \vdash \neg \bigwedge_{i=1}^{n} [\exists x \varphi_i \rightarrow$$

By the generalization lemma,

$$\Sigma \vdash \forall v_1 \dots \forall v_n \neg \bigwedge_{i=1}^n [\exists x \varphi_i \to \varphi_i(x_i)]$$

 $\phi_i(x_i)$ ].

so that

(\*\*) 
$$\Sigma \vdash \neg \exists v_1 \dots \exists v_n \bigwedge_{i=1}^n [\exists x \varphi_i \to \varphi_i(x_i)].$$

Now the  $x_i$  have been chosen in such a way that, if  $i \neq j$ , then  $x_i$  does not occur in  $\varphi_j(x_i)$ . So it follows from the quantifier lemma that the existential quantifiers on the right hand side of the turnstile in (\*\*) may be moved across the conjunctions and implications to yield

$$\Sigma \vdash \neg \bigwedge_{i=1}^{n} [\exists x \phi_i \to \exists x_i \phi_i(x_i)].$$

But since, clearly,  $\vdash \exists x \varphi_i \rightarrow \exists x_i \varphi_i(x_i)$  for each *i*, it follows that  $\Sigma$  is inconsistent, contradicting assumption. Accordingly  $\Sigma^*$  is consistent and the lemma is proved.

A set  $\Sigma \subseteq Sent(\mathscr{G})$  is said to be *complete* if, for any  $\sigma \in Sent(\mathscr{G})$ , we have  $\Sigma \vdash \sigma$  or  $\Sigma \vdash \neg \sigma$ .

**Lemma 2.** Suppose that  $\Sigma \subseteq Sent(\mathscr{D})$  is consistent. Then there is a complete consistent set  $\Sigma' \subseteq Sent(\mathscr{D})$  such that  $\Sigma \subseteq \Sigma'$ .

**Proof.** The family of consistent sets of sentences of  $\mathscr{L}$  containing  $\Sigma$ , ordered by inclusion, is easily seen to be closed under unions of chains, and so by Zorn's lemma has a maximal member  $\Sigma'$ . If  $\sigma \in Sent(\mathscr{D})$  and  $\Sigma' \nvDash \sigma$ , then  $\Sigma' \cup \{\neg\sigma\}$  is consistent by the consistency lemma. Since  $\Sigma'$  is maximal consistent, we must have  $\Sigma' \cup \{\neg\sigma\} = \Sigma'$ , so a fortiori  $\Sigma' \vdash \neg\sigma$ . Thus  $\Sigma'$  is complete and meets the requirements of the lemma.

**Theorem 1.** Suppose that  $\Sigma \subseteq Sent(\mathscr{G})$  is consistent. Then there is a simple extension  $\mathscr{G}^+$  of  $\mathscr{G}$  such that  $||\mathscr{G}^+|| = ||\mathscr{G}||$  and a complete saturated consistent set  $\Sigma^+ \subseteq Sent(\mathscr{G}^+)$  such that  $\Sigma \subseteq \Sigma^+$ .

**Proof.** We construct a sequence  $\mathscr{L}_0$ ,  $\mathscr{L}_1$ ,... of simple extensions of  $\mathscr{L}$  and a sequence  $\Sigma_0$ ,  $\Sigma_1$ ,... of consistent sets of sentences as follows. We begin by putting  $\mathscr{L}_0 = \mathscr{L}$  and  $\Sigma_0 = \Sigma$ . Suppose now that the consistent set  $\Sigma_n \subseteq Sent(\mathscr{L}_n)$  has been defined. By Lemma 1 there is a simple extension  $\mathscr{L}_n^*$  such that  $||\mathscr{L}_n^*|| = ||\mathscr{L}_n^*|$  and a consistent  $\mathscr{L}_n$ -saturated extension  $\Sigma_n^*$  of  $\Sigma_n$  in  $\mathscr{L}_n^*$ . And by Lemma 2, there is a complete consistent extension  $\Sigma_n^{*'}$  of  $\Sigma_n$  in  $\mathscr{L}_n^*$ : clearly  $\Sigma_n^{*'}$  is  $\mathscr{L}_n$ saturated also. We set  $\mathscr{L}_{n+1} = \mathscr{L}_n^*$ ,  $\Sigma_{n+1} = \Sigma_n^{*'}$ . Then  $\Sigma_{n+1}$  is a complete, consistent  $\mathscr{L}_n$ -saturated extension of  $\Sigma_n$  in  $\mathscr{L}_{n+1}$ .

Now we define  $\mathscr{D}^+$  to be the union of all the languages  $\mathscr{D}_n$  and  $\Sigma^+$  to be the union of all the sets  $\Sigma_n$ . Since  $||\mathscr{D}_n|| = ||\mathscr{D}_0|| = ||\mathscr{D}||$  for all *n*, it follows that  $||\mathscr{D}^+|| = ||\mathscr{D}||$ . Also,  $\Sigma^+ \subseteq Sent(\mathscr{D}^+), \Sigma \subseteq \Sigma^+$  and  $\Sigma^+$ , as the union of the chain  $\Sigma_0 \subseteq \Sigma_1 \subseteq ...$  of consistent sets, is itself consistent. For if  $\Sigma^+$  is inconsistent, let  $\Phi$  be the finite set of formulas of  $\mathscr{D}^+$  in a proof  $\mathscr{P}$  of a formula of the form  $\varphi \land \neg \varphi$  from  $\Sigma^+$ . Then  $\Phi \subseteq Form(\mathscr{D}_m)$  for some *m*, and  $\Sigma^+ \cap \Phi \subseteq \Sigma_n$  for some *n*. Writing *q* for the larger of *m*, *n*,  $\mathscr{P}$  is then a proof of  $\varphi \land \neg \varphi$  from  $\Sigma_q$  in  $\mathscr{L}_q$ , contradicting the consistency of  $\Sigma_q$ .

Moreover,  $\Sigma^+$  is complete. for, if  $\sigma \in Sent(\mathscr{G}^+)$ , then  $\sigma \in Sent(\mathscr{G}_n)$ , for some *n*, and so, since  $\Sigma_n$  is complete, either  $\Sigma_n \vdash \sigma$  or  $\Sigma_n \vdash \neg \sigma$ . Since  $\Sigma_n \subseteq \Sigma^+$ , it follows that  $\Sigma^+ \vdash \sigma$  or  $\Sigma^+ \vdash \neg \sigma$ , proving the claim.

Finally,  $\Sigma^+$  is saturated. For let  $\varphi(x)$  be a formula of  $\mathscr{D}^+$  with one free variable *x*. Then  $\varphi(x) \in Form(\mathscr{D}_n)$  for some *n*. Since  $\Sigma_{n+1}$  is an  $\mathscr{D}_n$ -saturated extension of  $\Sigma_n$  in  $\mathscr{D}_{n+1}$ , there is a

constant symbol *c* of  $\mathscr{D}_{n+1}$  for which the sentence  $\exists x \varphi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(c)$  is provable from  $\Sigma_{n+1}$ , and hence also, since  $\Sigma_{n+1} \subseteq \Sigma^+$ , from  $\Sigma^+$ . Therefore the latter is saturated as claimed.

Now let  $\Sigma$  be a fixed consistent set of sentences of  $\mathscr{D}$ . Let *C* be the set of constant symbols of  $\mathscr{D}$ , we shall assume that this set is nonempty. We define the relation  $\approx$  on *C* by

$$c \approx d \Leftrightarrow \Sigma \vdash c = d$$

It is easy to verify, using the equality axioms in  $\mathscr{D}$ , that  $\approx$  is an equivalence relation. For each  $c \in C$  write  $\tilde{c}$  for the equivalence class of c with respect to  $\approx$ ; thus

$$c = \{d \in C: \Sigma \vdash c = d\}.$$

Let

$$\tilde{C} = \{\tilde{c} : c \in C\}$$

be the set of all such equivalence classes. Corresponding to each predicate symbol  $P_i$  of  $\mathscr{D}$  define the  $\lambda(i)$ - ary relation  $R_i$  on  $\tilde{C}$  by

$$R_i(\widetilde{c_1},...,\widetilde{c_{\lambda(i)}}) \Leftrightarrow \Sigma \vdash P_i c_1...c_{\lambda(i)}.$$

We can now frame the

**Definition**. The *canonical structure* determined by  $\Sigma$  is the  $\mathscr{L}$ -structure

 $\mathfrak{A}_{\Sigma} = (\widetilde{C}, \{R_i: i \in I\}, \{\widetilde{c_i}: j \in J_i^{\mathfrak{d}}\}).$ 

Observe that  $\|\mathfrak{A}_{\Sigma}\| \leq |C|$ .

**Theorem 2.** Suppose that  $\Sigma$  is complete, consistent and saturated. Then  $\mathfrak{A}_{\Sigma}$  is a model of  $\Sigma$ .

**Proof.** We show that, for any  $\mathscr{P}$ -sentence  $\sigma$ ,

$$(*) \qquad \qquad \mathfrak{A}_{\Sigma} \vDash \sigma \iff \Sigma \vdash \sigma.$$

That this holds for atomic sentences is an immediate consequence of the definition of  $\mathfrak{A}_{\Sigma}$ . We now argue by induction on the degree of complexity of the sentence  $\sigma$ .

Suppose then that n > 0 and that (\*) holds for all sentences of degree < n. Let  $\sigma$  have degree *n*; then  $\sigma$  is either a conjunction or a negation of sentences of degree < n, or an existentialization of a formula of degree < n. Verifying (\*) in the first two cases is routine (using the completeness of  $\Sigma$  in the negation case) and we omit the details. In the last case,  $\sigma$  is of the form  $\exists x \varphi(x)$ , where  $\varphi$  has degree < n. We then have

$$\mathfrak{A}_{\Sigma} \models \sigma \iff \mathfrak{A}_{\Sigma} \models \exists x \varphi(x)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \mathfrak{A}_{\Sigma} \models \varphi[\tilde{c}] \text{ for some } c \in C$$
(by constants lemma)
$$\Leftrightarrow \mathfrak{A}_{\Sigma} \models \varphi(c) \text{ for some } c \in C$$
(by (\*))
$$\Leftrightarrow \Sigma \vdash \varphi(c) \text{ for some } c \in C$$
(since  $\Sigma$  is saturated)
$$\Leftrightarrow \Sigma \vdash \exists x \varphi(x)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \Sigma \vdash \sigma.$$

Therefore  $\sigma$  satisfies (\*) and the proof is complete.

These results have the following important corollaries.

**Model Existence Theorem** (Gödel-Henkin). Any consistent set  $\Sigma$  of first-order sentences has a model of cardinality at most max( $\aleph_0, |\Sigma|$ ).

**Proof.** Let  $\kappa = \max(\aleph_0, |\Sigma|)$ ; then  $\kappa = ||\mathscr{G}_{\Sigma}||$  by the lemma on p. 3. By Theorem 1 we can extend  $\Sigma$  to a complete consistent saturated set of sentences  $\Phi$  in a simple extension  $\mathscr{G}'$  of  $\mathscr{G}_{\Sigma}$  such that  $||\mathscr{G}'|| = ||\mathscr{G}_{\Sigma}|| = \kappa$ . By Theorem 2, the canonical structure  $\mathfrak{A}_{\Phi}$  is a model of  $\Phi$  and hence also of  $\Sigma$ . The expansion theorem implies that the  $\mathscr{G}_{\Sigma}$ -reduction  $\mathfrak{A}'$  of  $\mathfrak{A}_{\Phi}$  is a model of  $\Sigma$ , and that any  $\mathscr{G}$ -expansion  $\mathfrak{A}$  of  $\mathfrak{A}'$  is likewise. Moreover, if *C* is the set of constant symbols of  $\mathscr{G}'$ , then  $||\mathfrak{A}|| = ||\mathfrak{A}_{\Phi}|| \le |C| \le ||\mathscr{G}_{\Sigma}|| = \kappa$ . The proof is complete.

**Completeness Theorem.** If  $\Sigma \subseteq Sent(\mathscr{D})$  and  $\sigma \in Sent(\mathscr{D})$ , then  $\Sigma \vdash \sigma \Rightarrow \Sigma \vDash \sigma$ .

**Proof.** If  $\Sigma \nvDash \sigma$ , then, by the consistency theorem,  $\Sigma \cup \{\sigma\}$  is consistent and so, by the model existence theorem, has a model  $\mathfrak{A}$ . Since  $\mathfrak{A}$  is a model of  $\Sigma$  but not of  $\sigma$ , it follows that  $\Sigma \nvDash \sigma$ .

**Compactness Theorem.** A set of first-order sentences  $\Sigma$  has a model iff every finite subset of  $\Sigma$  has a model.

**Proof.** One way round is trivial. If, conversely, every finite subset of  $\Sigma$  has a model, then every finite subset of  $\Sigma$  is consistent and so  $\Sigma$  itself is consistent by the consistency lemma. Therefore  $\Sigma$  has a model by the model existence theorem.

**Invariance Theorem.** Provability and consistency are *invariant with respect to language*. That is, if  $\Sigma \subseteq Sent(\mathscr{D})$  and  $\sigma \in Sent(\mathscr{D})$ , and  $\mathscr{D}^*$  is an extension of  $\mathscr{D}$ , then

(a)  $\Sigma \vdash \sigma$  in  $\mathscr{L} \Leftrightarrow \Sigma \vdash \sigma$  in  $\mathscr{L}^*$ 

(b)  $\Sigma$  is consistent in  $\mathscr{L} \Leftrightarrow \Sigma$  is consistent in  $\mathscr{L}^*$ .

**Proof.** We prove (a); (b) is an immediate consequence. Clearly  $\Sigma \vdash \sigma$  in  $\mathscr{L} \Leftrightarrow \Sigma \vdash \sigma$  in  $\mathscr{L}^*$ . Conversely, if  $\Sigma \vdash \sigma$  in  $\mathscr{L}^*$ , then  $\Sigma \models \sigma$  by the completeness theorem, that is, every  $\mathscr{L}^*$ -structure which is a model of  $\Sigma$  is also a model of  $\sigma$ . If  $\mathfrak{A}$  is any  $\mathscr{L}$ -structure which is a model of  $\Sigma$ , it can be expanded to an  $\mathscr{L}^*$ -structure  $\mathfrak{A}^*$  which, by the expansion lemma, is also a model of  $\mathscr{L}$ . Then  $\mathfrak{A}^*$  is a model of  $\sigma$ , and so, applying the expansion lemma again,  $\mathfrak{A}$ , as the  $\mathscr{L}$ -reduction of  $\mathfrak{A}^*$ , is a model of  $\sigma$ . Therefore, by the completeness theorem,  $\Sigma \vdash \sigma$  in  $\mathscr{L}$ .

**Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem.** If a set  $\Sigma$  of first-order sentences has an infinite model, it has a model of any cardinality  $\kappa \geq \max(\aleph_0, |\Sigma|)$ .

**Proof.** For simplicity write  $\mathscr{D}$  for  $\mathscr{D}_{\Sigma}$ . Let  $\mathscr{D}^*$  be the simple extension of  $\mathscr{D}$  obtained by adding a set  $\{d_j: j \in J\}$  of new constant symbols, where  $|J| = \kappa$ . Let

 $\Sigma^* = \Sigma \cup \{\neg (d_j = d_k): j, k \in J \& j \neq k\}.$ 

If  $\Sigma_0$  is any finite subset of  $\Sigma^*$ , only finitely many sentences of the form  $\neg(d_j = d_k)$  occur in  $\Sigma_0$ ; let  $d_{j_1}, ..., d_{j_n}$  be a list of all constant symbols occurring in such sentences in  $\Sigma_0$ . If now  $\mathfrak{A}$  is an infinite model of  $\Sigma$  (which we may take to be an  $\mathscr{P}$ -structure), choose *n* distinct elements  $a_{1,...,n}, a_n$  of its domain *A*. Let  $\mathfrak{A}^*$  be the  $\mathscr{P}^*$ -expansion of  $\mathfrak{A}$  in which the interpretation of  $d_{j_p}$  is  $a_p$ for p = 1,..., n and that of  $d_j$  is an arbitrary element of *A* for  $j \notin \{j_1, ..., j_n\}$ . Clearly  $\mathfrak{A}^*$  is then a model of  $\Sigma_0$ .

It follows that every finite subset of  $\Sigma^*$  has a model. Thus every finite subset of  $\Sigma^*$  is consistent and so  $\Sigma^*$  is itself consistent. Clearly  $|\Sigma^*| = \kappa$ , so the model existence theorem implies that  $\Sigma^*$  has a model of cardinality  $\leq \kappa$ . Since the interpretations of the  $d_j$  in any model of  $\Sigma^*$  must be distinct, any such model must have cardinality  $\geq \kappa$ . So  $\Sigma^*$  has a model of cardinality  $\kappa$ ; its  $\mathscr{D}$ -reduction is a model of  $\Sigma$  of cardinality  $\kappa$ .

**Overspill Theorem.** If a set of first-order sentences has arbitrarily large finite models, it has an infinite model.

**Proof.** For each  $n \in \omega$  let  $\sigma_n$  be a sentence (formulable in any first-order language with equality) asserting that there at least *n* individuals. Given a set  $\Sigma$  of first-order sentences, let  $\Sigma^* = \Sigma \cup {\sigma_n: n \in \omega}$ . If  $\Sigma$  has arbitrarily large finite models, then each finite subset of  $\Sigma^*$  has a model, so by the compactness theorem  $\Sigma^*$  has a model, which must evidently be an infinite model of  $\Sigma$ .

### 5. Relations between structures.

Let  $\mathfrak{A} = (A, \{R_i: i \in I\}, \{e_j: j \in J\})$  and  $\mathfrak{B} = (B, \{S_i: i \in I\}, \{d_j: j \in J\})$  be structures of the same type  $(\lambda, J)$ . We say that  $\mathfrak{A}$  is a *substructure* of  $\mathfrak{B}$ , written  $\mathfrak{A} \subseteq \mathfrak{B}$ ,  $i_j = d_j$  for all  $j \in J$ , and  $R_i = S_i \cap A^{\lambda(i)}$  for all  $i \in I$ . If *C* is a nonempty subset of *B* containing all the designated elements of  $\mathfrak{B}$ , we define the substructure  $\mathfrak{B} \mid C$  of  $\mathfrak{B}$  by

 $\mathfrak{B}[C = (C, \{S_i \cap C^{\lambda(i)}: i \in I\}, \{d_j: j \in J\}).$ 

An *embedding* of a structure  $\mathfrak{A}$  into a structure  $\mathfrak{B}$  is an injective map  $f: A \to B$  such that  $f(e_j) = d_j$  for all  $j \in J$ , and for all  $i \in I$  and  $a_1, ..., a_{\lambda(i)} \in A$ , we have  $R_i(a_1, ..., a_{\lambda(i)}) \Leftrightarrow S_i(fa_1, ..., fa_{\lambda(i)}).$ 

If there exists an embedding of  $\mathfrak{A}$  into  $\mathfrak{B}$ , we say that  $\mathfrak{A}$  is *embeddable* into  $\mathfrak{B}$  and write  $\mathfrak{A} \sqsubseteq \mathfrak{B}$ .

If *f* is an embedding of  $\mathfrak{A}$  into  $\mathfrak{B}$ , we write  $f[\mathfrak{A}]$  for the structure  $\mathfrak{B}[f[A]$ . A surjective embedding is called an *isomorphism*. If there exists an isomorphism between  $\mathfrak{A}$  and  $\mathfrak{B}$ , they are said to be *isomorphic* and we write  $\mathfrak{A} \cong \mathfrak{B}$ .

Let  $\mathscr{D}$  be the first-order language of type  $(\lambda, J)$ . We say that the  $\mathscr{D}$ -structures  $\mathfrak{A}$  and  $\mathfrak{B}$  are *elementarily equivalent*, and write  $\mathfrak{A} \equiv \mathfrak{B}$ , if  $\mathfrak{A} \models \sigma \Leftrightarrow \mathfrak{B} \models \sigma$  for any  $\mathscr{D}$ -sentence  $\sigma$ . It is easily shown that isomorphic structures are elementarily equivalent, but the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem implies that the converse fails.

The  $\mathscr{L}$ -structure  $\mathfrak{A}$  is said to be an *elementary substructure* of the  $\mathscr{L}$ -structure  $\mathfrak{B}$ , and  $\mathfrak{B}$  an *elementary extension* of  $\mathfrak{A}$ , if  $\mathfrak{A} \subseteq \mathfrak{B}$  and, for any  $\mathscr{L}$ -formula  $\varphi(v_0, ..., v_n)$  and any  $a_0, ..., a_n \in A$ ,

we have

$$\mathfrak{A} \vDash \varphi[a_0, ..., a_n] \iff \mathfrak{B} \vDash \varphi[a_0, ..., a_n].$$

In this situation we write  $\mathfrak{A} \prec \mathfrak{B}$ . Evidently  $\mathfrak{A} \prec \mathfrak{B} \Rightarrow \mathfrak{A} \equiv \mathfrak{B}$ , but the converse is easily seen to be false.

An embedding f of  $\mathfrak{A}$  into  $\mathfrak{B}$  is called an *elementary embedding* if for any  $\mathscr{L}$ -formula  $\varphi(v_0, ..., v_n)$  and any  $a_0, ..., a_n \in A$  we have

$$\mathfrak{A} \models \varphi[a_0, ..., a_n] \Leftrightarrow \mathfrak{B} \models [fa_0, ..., fa_n].$$

In this situation we write  $f: \mathfrak{A} \prec \mathfrak{B}$ . If such an f exists, we write  $\mathfrak{A} \preceq \mathfrak{B}$ . Clearly  $\mathfrak{A} \preceq \mathfrak{B} \Rightarrow \mathfrak{A} \equiv \mathfrak{B}$ . It is also easily shown that *any isomorphism is an elementary embedding*.

**Tarski-Vaught Lemma**. If  $\mathfrak{A}$  and  $\mathfrak{B}$  are  $\mathscr{D}$ -structures, then  $\mathfrak{A} \prec \mathfrak{B}$  iff  $\mathfrak{A} \subseteq \mathfrak{B}$  and, for any  $\mathscr{D}$ -formula  $\varphi(v_0, ..., v_n)$  and any  $a_0, ..., a_{n-1} \in A$ ,

(\*) if  $\mathfrak{B} \models \exists v_n \varphi[a_0, ..., a_{n-1}]$ , then, for some  $a \in A$ ,  $\mathfrak{A} \models \varphi[a_0, ..., a_{n-1}, a]$ .

**Proof.** One direction is trivial. Conversely, suppose that (\*) holds. We prove by induction on the degree of  $\varphi$  that, for any *n*, any  $\mathscr{D}$ -formula  $\varphi(v_0, ..., v_n)$  and any  $a_0, ..., a_n \in A$ ,

(\*\*) 
$$\mathfrak{A} \vDash \varphi[a_0, ..., a_n] \Leftrightarrow \mathfrak{B} \vDash \varphi[a_0, ..., a_n].$$

That (\*\*) holds for atomic formulas is obvious, as are the induction steps for  $\neg$  and  $\land$ . It remains to show that, if it holds for  $\varphi$ , it also holds for  $\exists v_k \varphi$ . Without loss of generality we may assume that *n* is greater than the index of every variable (free or bound) occurring in  $\varphi$ , and then, by making a suitable change of variable in  $\varphi$  (i.e., by substituting  $v_n$  for  $v_k$ ), that k = n.

If  $\mathfrak{A} \models \exists v_n \varphi[a_0, ..., a_{n-1}]$ , then  $\mathfrak{A} \models \varphi[a_0, ..., a_{n-1}, a]$  for some  $a \in A$ , and it follows from (\*\*) for  $\varphi$  that  $\mathfrak{B} \models \varphi[a_0, ..., a_{n-1}, a]$ , whence  $\mathfrak{B} \models \exists v_n \varphi[a_0, ..., a_{n-1}]$ . Conversely, if  $\mathfrak{B} \models \exists v_n \varphi[a_0, ..., a_{n-1}]$ , then, by (\*),  $\mathfrak{B} \models \varphi[a_0, ..., a_{n-1}, a]$  for some  $a \in A$ , whence  $\mathfrak{A} \models \varphi[a_0, ..., a_{n-1}, a]$  by (\*\*), so that  $\mathfrak{A} \models \exists v_n \varphi[a_0, ..., a_{n-1}]$ . This completes the induction step and the proof.

**Corollary**. Write **Q** and  $\mathbb{R}$  for the sets of rational and real numbers. Then

$$(\mathbf{Q}, \leq) \prec (\mathbb{R}, \leq)$$

**Proof.** We show that the Tarski-Vaught lemma applies. Suppose that, for a formula  $\varphi(v_0, ..., v_n)$  of the appropriate language, and  $a_0 < ... < a_{n-1} \in \mathbf{Q}$ , we have  $(\mathbb{R}, \leq) \models \exists v_n \varphi[a_0, ..., a_{n-1}]$ . Then there is  $b \in \mathbb{R}$  such that  $(\mathbb{R}, \leq) \models \varphi[a_0, ..., a_{n-1}, b]$ . Say  $a_i < b < a_{i+1}$  (the cases  $b < \text{or } > \text{all } a_i$  being similar). Choose a to be any rational such that  $a_i < a < a_{i+1}$ . It is easy to construct an isomorphism  $f: \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$  such that  $f(a_j) = a_j$  for  $0 \leq j \leq n-1$  and f(b) = a. This f is also an elementary embedding. Hence  $(\mathbb{R}, \leq) \models \varphi[fa_0, ..., fa_{n-1}, b]$ , i.e.  $(\mathbb{R}, \leq) \models \varphi[a_0, ..., a_{n-1}, a]$ . Since  $a \in \mathbf{Q}$ , the Tarski-Vaught lemma applies to yield the required conclusion.

Given a set X, let  $\mathscr{D}_X$  be the simple extension of  $\mathscr{D}$  obtained by adding a set  $\{c_x: x \in X\}$  of distinct new constant symbols indexed by X. If  $\mathfrak{A}$  is an  $\mathscr{D}$ -structure and X is a subset of its domain A, we write  $(\mathfrak{A}, X)$  for the  $\mathscr{D}_X$ -expansion of  $\mathfrak{A}$  in which the interpretation of each  $c_x$  is x. If f is a mapping of X into the domain B of an  $\mathscr{D}$ -structure  $\mathfrak{B}$ , we write  $(\mathfrak{B}, f[X])$  for the  $\mathscr{D}_X$ -expansion of  $\mathfrak{A}$  in which the interpretation of each  $c_x$  is x.

The *diagram* of  $\mathfrak{A}$ ,  $\Delta(\mathfrak{A})$ , is the set of atomic and negated atomic sentences that hold in  $(\mathfrak{A}, A)$ . The *complete diagram* of  $\mathfrak{A}$ ,  $\Gamma(\mathfrak{A})$ , is the set of all sentences of  $\mathscr{G}_A$  that hold in  $(\mathfrak{A}, A)$ . The proof of the following lemma is then straightforward.

**Diagram lemma.** Let  $\mathfrak{A}$  and  $\mathfrak{B}$  be  $\mathscr{L}$ -structures. Then:

(i)  $\mathfrak{A} \sqsubseteq \mathfrak{B}$  iff  $\mathfrak{B}$  can be expanded to a model of  $\Delta(\mathfrak{A})$ ;

(ii)  $\mathfrak{A} \preceq \mathfrak{B}$  iff  $\mathfrak{B}$  can be expanded to a model of  $\Gamma(\mathfrak{A})$ ;

(iii) if  $\mathfrak{A} \subseteq \mathfrak{B}$ , then  $\mathfrak{A} \prec \mathfrak{B}$  iff  $(\mathfrak{B}, A) \vDash \Gamma(\mathfrak{A})$ ;

(iv) an embedding f of  $\mathfrak{A}$  into  $\mathfrak{B}$  is an elementary embedding iff  $(\mathfrak{A}, A) \equiv (\mathfrak{B}, f[A])$ .

We now show that infinite structures have elementary substructures and extensions of most cardinalities.

**Theorem**. Let  $\mathfrak{A}$  be an infinite  $\mathscr{D}$ -structure.

(i) If  $X \subseteq A$ , then for any cardinal satisfying  $\max(|X|, ||\mathscr{L}||) \le \kappa \le |A|$ , there is an elementary substructure  $\mathfrak{B}$  of  $\mathfrak{A}$  such that  $|B| = \kappa$  and  $X \subset B$ .

(ii)  $\mathfrak{A}$  has an elementary extension of any cardinality  $\geq \max(|X|, ||\mathscr{S}||)$ .

**Proof.** (i) Let < be some fixed well-ordering of *A*. We define a sequence  $B_0$ ,  $B_1$ ,... of subsets of *A* recursively as follows. Choose  $B_0$  to be any subset of *A* such that  $|B_0| = \kappa$  and  $X \subseteq B_0$ . If  $B_n$  has been defined, put

 $B_{n+1} = \{b: \text{ for some } \mathscr{D}\text{-formula } \varphi(v_0, ..., v_m) \text{ and some } b_0, ..., b_{m-1} \in B_n, b \text{ is the } <\text{-least} element of A such that } \mathfrak{A} \models \varphi[b_0, ..., b_{m-1}, b] \}.$ 

It is easy to check that  $B_n \subseteq B_{n+1}$  and that  $|B_{n+1}| = \kappa$ . Now define *B* to be the union of the  $B_n$  and  $\mathfrak{B} = \mathfrak{A} | B$ . Then  $\mathfrak{B}$  is a substructure of  $\mathfrak{A}$  of cardinality  $\kappa$  and it is easy to apply the Tarski-Vaught lemma to conclude that  $\mathfrak{B} \prec \mathfrak{A}$ .

(ii) Let  $\Gamma$  be the complete diagram of  $\mathfrak{A}$ . Then  $|\Gamma| = \max(|X|, ||\mathscr{L}||)$ . Since  $\Gamma$  is evidently consistent, the model existence theorem implies that it has a model of any cardinality  $\kappa \ge |\Gamma| = \max(|A|, ||\mathscr{L}||)$ . The result now follows from the diagram lemma.

### 6. Ultraproducts

A *filter* over a set *I* is a family  $\mathscr{F}$  of subsets of *I* such that (i)  $X, Y \in \mathscr{F} \Leftrightarrow X \cap Y \in \mathscr{F}$ , (ii)  $\emptyset \notin \mathscr{F}$ . It follows immediately from (i) that any filter  $\mathscr{F}$  over *I* satisfies;  $X \in \mathscr{F}$  and  $X \subseteq Y \in \mathscr{F} \Rightarrow Y \in \mathscr{F}$ . An *ultrafilter* over *I* is a filter  $\mathscr{U}$  over *I* satisfying the condition: for any  $X \in \mathscr{U}$ , either  $X \in \mathscr{U}$  or  $I - X \in \mathscr{U}$ . In particular, for any  $i \in I$ ,  $\mathscr{U}_i = \{X \subseteq I : i \in X\}$  is an ultrafilter over *I* called the *principal* ultrafilter generated by *i*. It is easily shown that an ultrafilter is precisely a filter that is maximal in the sense that it is included in no filter apart from itself. A straightforward application of Zorn's Lemma shows that a family  $\mathscr{A}$  of subsets of *I* is included in an ultrafilter over *I* if and only if it has the *finite intersection property:* that is, for any finite subfamily  $\mathscr{B}$  of  $\mathscr{A}$ we have  $\bigcap \mathscr{B} \neq \emptyset$ .

For ease of exposition we confine our attention throughout this section to structures consisting of a nonempty set and a single binary relation on that set. The appropriate language  $\mathscr{G}$  for such structures thus has a single predicate symbol of degree 2, say  $P_0$ . The type of these structures, and of  $\mathscr{G}$ , is then ((0, 2),  $\emptyset$ ). It should be clear that everything we do can be extended to arbitrary structures merely by complicating the notation.

Now let *I* be some arbitrary fixed index set, and for each  $i \in I$  let  $\mathfrak{A}_i = (A_i, R_i)$  be an  $\mathscr{L}$ -structure. Let  $\Pi A_i$  be the Cartesian product of the sets  $A_i$ : we use letters *f*, *g*, *h*, *f'*, *g'*, *h'* to denote elements of  $\Pi A_i$ .

Given a family  $\mathscr{F}$  of subsets of *I*, we define the relation  $\sim_{\mathscr{F}}$  on  $\prod A_i$  by

$$f \sim_{\mathscr{F}} g \Leftrightarrow \{i \in I : f(i) = g(i)\} \in \mathscr{F}.$$

It is easily shown that, if  $\mathscr{F}$  is a filter over I, then  $\sim_{\mathscr{F}}$  is an equivalence relation on  $\prod A_i$ . From here on we shall suppose that  $\mathscr{F}$  is a filter over I. For each  $f \in \prod A_i$  we write  $f / \mathscr{F}$  for the  $\sim_{\mathscr{F}}$ -equivalence class of f, and we define

$$\Pi A_i / \mathscr{F} = \{ f / \mathscr{F} \colon f \in \Pi A_i \}.$$

We define the relation *R* on  $\Pi A_i$  by:

$$(f, g) \in R \Leftrightarrow \{i \in I : (f(i), g(i)) \in R_i\} \in \mathscr{F}$$

It is not difficult to show that *R* is compatible with  $\sim_{\mathscr{F}}$  in the sense that, if  $f \sim_{\mathscr{F}} f'$  and  $g \sim_{\mathscr{F}} g'$ , then  $fRg \Rightarrow f'Rg'$ . That being the case, the relation *R* on  $\Pi A_i$  induces the relation  $R_F$  on  $\Pi A_i/\mathscr{F}$  given by

$$(f/\mathscr{F}, g/\mathscr{F}) \in R_F \Leftrightarrow fRg.$$

The  $\mathscr{D}$ -structure  $\Pi \mathfrak{A}_i / \mathscr{F} = (\Pi A_i / \mathscr{F}, R_F)$  is called the *reduced product* of the family  $\{\mathfrak{A}_i: i \in I\}$  over the filter  $\mathscr{F}$  if  $\mathscr{F}$  is an ultrafilter, the reduced product over  $\mathscr{F}$  is called an *ultraproduct*. If, for each  $i \in I$ ,  $\mathfrak{A}_i$  is a fixed structure  $\mathfrak{A}$ , the reduced product is denoted by  $\mathfrak{A}^I / \mathscr{F}$  and is called the *reduced power* of  $\mathfrak{A}$  over  $\mathscr{F}$ . When  $\mathscr{F}$  is an ultrafilter the reduced power is called an *ultrapower*.

Observe that if  $\mathscr{F}$  is the filter  $\{I\}$ , the reduced power  $\Pi \mathfrak{A}_i / \mathscr{F}$  is isomorphic to  $(\Pi A_i, R)$ , and that, for  $k \in I$ , the ultraproduct  $\Pi \mathfrak{A}_i / \mathscr{U}_k$  is isomorphic to  $\mathfrak{A}_k$ .

If  $f = (f_0, f_1,...)$  is a sequence of elements of  $\prod A_i$ , that is, if  $f \in (\prod A_i)^{\omega}$ , we write f(i) for the sequence  $(f_0(i), f_1(i),...) \in A_i^{\omega}$  and, if  $\mathcal{U}$  is an ultrafilter over I,  $f / \mathcal{U}$  for the sequence

 $(f_0/\mathcal{U}, f_1/\mathcal{U}, \ldots) \in (\prod A_i/\mathcal{U})^{\omega}.$ 

We now prove the fundamental theorem on ultraproducts, viz.,

**Loś's Theorem.** If  $\mathscr{U}$  is an ultrafilter over *I*,  $\varphi$  a formula of  $\mathscr{L}$  and *f* a sequence of elements of  $\prod A_i$ , then

(\*)  $\Pi \mathfrak{A}_{i}/\mathscr{U} \vDash_{\mathfrak{f}/\mathscr{U}} \varphi \Leftrightarrow \{i \in I: \mathfrak{A}_{i} \vDash_{\mathfrak{f}(i)} \varphi\} \in \mathscr{U}$ 

**Proof.** The proof goes by induction on the complexity of  $\varphi$ . That (\*) holds for atomic  $\varphi$  is a straightforward consequence of the definitions of  $\sim_{\mathscr{F}}$  and  $R_F$ . The induction steps for  $\wedge$  and  $\neg$  follow easily from the defining properties of ultrafilters. Now suppose that (\*) holds for  $\varphi$  (and arbitrary f); we show that it holds for  $\exists v_n \varphi$ .

Define

$$D = \{ i \in I: \mathfrak{A}_i \models_{f(i)} \exists v_n \varphi \}.$$

We have to show that

$$\Pi \mathfrak{A}_i / \mathscr{U} \models_{f/\mathscr{U}} \exists v_n \varphi \Leftrightarrow D \in \mathscr{U}$$

Suppose that  $\Pi \mathfrak{A}_i / \mathscr{U} \models_{f/\mathscr{U}} \exists v_n \varphi$ . Then there is some  $b \in \Pi A_i$  for which  $\Pi \mathfrak{A}_i / \mathscr{U} \models_{[n|b] f/\mathscr{U}} \varphi$ . Let  $E = \{i \in I: \mathfrak{A}_i \models_{([n|b] f)(i)} \varphi\}$ . Then by the induction hypothesis  $E \in F$ . And since ([n|b] f)(i) = [n|b(i)]f(i), it follows that  $E \subseteq D$ , and so because  $\mathscr{U}$  is a filter,  $D \in \mathscr{U}$ .

Conversely suppose that  $D \in \mathcal{U}$ . If  $i \in D$ , then there is some  $b_i \in A_i$  such that  $\mathfrak{A}_i \models_{[n/b_i]f(i)} \varphi$ . By the axiom of choice there is  $c \in \prod A_i$  for which  $c(i) = b_i$  for every  $i \in D$ , and is an arbitrary element of  $A_i$  otherwise. Defining

$$C = \{i \in I: \mathfrak{A}_i \vDash_{([n|c]f)(i)} \varphi\},\$$

we have  $D \subseteq C$  so that  $C \in \mathcal{U}$ . It now follows from the induction hypothesis that

$$\Pi \mathfrak{A}_i / \mathscr{U} \vDash_{([n|c]f)/\mathscr{U}} \varphi,$$

i.e., since  $([n|c]f)/\mathcal{U} = [n|c/\mathcal{U}]f/\mathcal{U}$ ,

 $\Pi \mathfrak{A}_i/\mathscr{U} \models_{[n|c/\mathscr{U}]} \mathfrak{f}/\mathscr{U} \varphi.$ 

Therefore

 $\Pi \mathfrak{A}_i / \mathscr{U} \vDash_{f/\mathscr{U}} \exists v_n \varphi,$ 

completing the proof of the theorem.  $\blacksquare$ 

As an immediate consequence we have the

**Corollary.** For any  $\mathscr{L}$ - sentence  $\sigma$  we have  $\Pi \mathfrak{A}_i / \mathscr{U} \vDash \sigma \Leftrightarrow \{i \in I: \mathfrak{A}_i \vDash \sigma\} \in \mathscr{U}. \blacksquare$ 

Let  $\mathfrak{A}$  be a structure and let  $\mathscr{U}$  be an ultrafilter on the set *I*. For each  $a \in A$  let  $\hat{a} \in A^{I}$  be the function given by  $\hat{a}(i) = a$  for all  $i \in I$ . The *canonical embedding* of  $\mathfrak{A}$  into  $\mathfrak{A}^{I}/\mathscr{U}$  is the map  $d: A \to A^{I}/\mathscr{U}$  defined by  $d(a) = \hat{a}/\mathscr{U}$ . It is a straightforward consequence of Łoś's theorem that d is an elementary embedding.

Łoś's theorem may also be used to provide a simple direct proof of the compactness

theorem, avoiding the use of the completeness theorem. To wit, suppose that each finite subset  $\Delta$  of a given set  $\Sigma$  of sentences has a model  $\mathfrak{A}_{\Delta}$ ; for simplicity write *I* for the family of all finite subsets of  $\Sigma$ . For each  $\Delta \in I$  let  $\widetilde{\Delta} = \{ \Phi \in I : \Delta \subseteq \Phi \}$ . For any members  $\Delta_1, \ldots, \Delta_n$  of *I*, we have  $\Delta_1 \cup \ldots \cup \Delta_n \in \widetilde{\Delta_1} \cap \ldots \cap \widetilde{\Delta_n}$ ,

and so the collection  $\{\tilde{\Delta} : \Delta \in I\}$  has the finite intersection property. It can therefore be extended to an ultrafilter  $\mathscr{U}$  over *I*. The ultraproduct  $\prod_{i=1}^{n} \mathfrak{A}_{\Delta} / \mathscr{U}$  is then a model of  $\Sigma$ . For if

 $\sigma \in \Sigma$ , then  $\{\sigma\} \in \Delta$ , and  $\mathfrak{A}_{\{\sigma\}} \models \sigma$ ; moreover,  $\mathfrak{A}_{\Delta} \models \sigma$  whenever  $\sigma \in \Delta$ . Hence

$$[\overline{\sigma}] = \{\Delta \in I : \sigma \in \Delta\} \subseteq \{\Delta \in I : \mathfrak{A}_{\Delta} \models \sigma\}.$$

Since  $\{\widetilde{\sigma}\} \in \mathcal{U}, \{\Delta \in I : \mathfrak{A}_{\Delta} \models \sigma\} \in \mathcal{U}$  and therefore, by Łoś's theorem,  $\prod_{\Delta \in I} \mathfrak{A}_{\Delta} / \mathcal{U} \models \sigma$ . The proof is complete.

### 7. Completeness and categoricity

For simplicity, throughout this section we let  $\mathscr{D}$  be a *countable* first-order language. By a *theory* in  $\mathscr{D}$  we shall mean a set  $\Sigma$  of  $\mathscr{D}$ -sentences which is closed under provability, i.e such that, for each  $\mathscr{D}$ -sentence  $\sigma$ , if  $\Sigma \vdash \sigma$ , then  $\sigma \in \Sigma$ . A subset  $\Gamma$  of a theory  $\Sigma$  is called a *set of postulates* for  $\Sigma$  if  $\Gamma \vdash \sigma$  for every  $\sigma \in \Sigma$ . Clearly each set  $\Gamma$  of  $\mathscr{D}$ -sentences is a set of postulates for a unique theory  $\Sigma$ , namely  $\Sigma = \{\sigma \in Sent(\mathscr{D}): \Gamma \vdash \sigma\}$ . For each  $\mathscr{D}$ -structure  $\mathfrak{A}$  let  $\Theta(\mathfrak{A})$ , the *theory* of  $\mathfrak{A}$ , be the set of all  $\mathscr{D}$ -sentences holding in  $\mathfrak{A}$ . Clearly  $\Theta(\mathfrak{A})$  is a complete theory.

The following lemma is a straightforward consequence of the completeness theorem.

**Lemma.** The following conditions on a consistent theory  $\Sigma$  in  $\mathscr{L}$  are equivalent: (i)  $\Sigma$  is complete; (ii) any pair of models of  $\Sigma$  are elementarily equivalent; (iii)  $\Sigma = \Theta(\mathfrak{A})$  for some  $\mathscr{L}$ -structure  $\mathfrak{A}$ .

Let  $\kappa$  be an infinite cardinal. A theory  $\Sigma$  is said to be  $\kappa$ -categorical if any pair of models of  $\Sigma$  of cardinality  $\kappa$  are isomorphic.

**Examples.** (i) Let  $\mathscr{D}$  have no extralogical symbols and let  $\Sigma$  be the set of all  $\mathscr{D}$ -sentences which hold in every  $\mathscr{D}$ -structure. Then  $\Sigma$  is  $\kappa$ -categorical for every infinite  $\kappa$ .

(ii) Let  $\mathscr{D}$  have just one unary predicate symbol P and let  $\Sigma$  be the set of  $\mathscr{D}$ -sentences which hold in every  $\mathscr{D}$ -structure. Then  $\Sigma$  is *not*  $\kappa$ -categorical for any infinite  $\kappa$ .

(iii) Let  $\mathscr{D}$  be as in (ii) and for each matural number *m* let  $\sigma_m$  be the first-order sentence which asserts that there are at least *m* individuals having the property *P* and at least *m* individuals not having *P*. Let  $\Sigma$  be the theory with the set of all  $\sigma_m$  as postulates. Then  $\Sigma$  is  $\aleph_0$ -categorical

but not  $\kappa$ -categorical for any  $\kappa > \aleph_0$ .

(iv) Let  $\mathscr{D}$  be the language whose sole extralogical symbols are countably many constants  $c_0, c_1,...$  and let  $\Sigma$  be the theory with postulates  $\{\neg(c_m = c_n): m \neq n\}$ . Then  $\Sigma$  is  $\kappa$ -categorical for every  $\kappa > \aleph_0$  but not  $\aleph_0$ -categorical.

One of the deepest results in model theory is *Morley's theorem* (whose proof is too difficult to be included here) which asserts that the four possibilities above are *exhaustive*, that is, if a theory in a countable language is  $\kappa$ -categorical for *some*  $\kappa > \aleph_0$ , it is  $\kappa$ -categorical for *all*  $\kappa > \aleph_0$ .

The next result provides a simple, but useful, sufficient condition for completeness.

**Theorem.** (Vaught's test.) Let  $\Sigma$  be a consistent theory with no finite models and which is  $\kappa$ -categorical for some infinite  $\kappa$ . Then  $\Sigma$  is complete.

**Proof.** If  $\Sigma$  is not complete, then there is a sentence  $\sigma$  such that neither  $\sigma$  nor  $\neg \sigma$  are provable from  $\Sigma$ . So both  $\Sigma \cup \{\sigma\}$  and  $\Sigma \cup \{\neg\sigma\}$  are consistent and hence have models, which must be infinite since  $\Sigma$  was assumed to have no finite models. Therefore, by Löwenheim-Skolem, both  $\Sigma \cup \{\sigma\}$  and  $\Sigma \cup \{\neg\sigma\}$  have models of cardinality  $\kappa$ . Since  $\sigma$  holds in one of these models but not in the other,  $\Sigma$  is not  $\kappa$ -categorical.

This theorem may be applied to establish the completeness of various theories.

**UDO** — the theory of *unbounded dense linear orderings* — is formulated in a language with just one binary predicate symbol R and has the following postulates (where we write  $x \neq y$  for  $\neg (x = y)$ ):

(i)  $\forall x Rxx \land \forall x \forall y [Rxy \land Ryx \rightarrow x = y] \land \forall x \forall y \forall z [Rxy \land Ryz \rightarrow Rxz]$   $\land \forall x \forall y [Rxy \lor Ryx]$ (ii)  $\forall x \forall y [Rxy \land x \neq y \rightarrow \exists x [x \neq z \land y \land z \land Rxz \land Rzy]]$ (iii)  $\forall x \exists y \exists z [x \neq y \land x \neq z \land Ryx \land Rxz]$ 

Postulate (i) asserts that *R* is a linear ordering, (ii) that it is dense, and (iii) that it is unbounded below and above. Natural examples of models of **UDO** are ( $\mathbf{Q}, \leq$ ) and ( $\mathbb{R}, \leq$ ).

**Theorem**. **UDO** is  $\aleph_0$ -categorical and so, by Vaught's test, complete.

**Proof.** Let  $(A, \leq)$  and  $(B, \leq)$  be denumerable models of **UDO**. Thus each is an unbounded dense linearly ordered set. Let  $A = \{a_n : n \in \omega\}$  and  $B = \{b_n : n \in \omega\}$ . We define two new sequences  $\{a_n^* : n \in \omega\}$  and  $\{b_n^* : n \in \omega\}$  as follows. First, put  $a_0^* = a_0$  and  $b_0^* = b_0$ . Now suppose k > 0; we consider two cases.

(i) k = 2m is even. In this case we put  $a_k^* = a_m$ . If, for some j < k,  $a_k^* = a_j^*$ , we put  $b_k^* = b_j^*$ . Otherwise we let  $b_k^*$  be some element of *B* bearing the same order relations to  $b_0^*$ , ...,  $b_{k-1}^*$  as does  $a_k^*$  to  $a_0^*$ , ...,  $a_{k-1}^*$ ; that is, for each j < k, if  $a_k^* > \text{or } < a_j^*$ , then  $b_k^* > \text{or } < b_j^*$ . Since  $(B, \leq)$  is a dense unbounded linearly ordered set, it is clear that such an element can always be found.

(ii) k = 2m + 1 is odd. In this case we put  $b_k^* = b_m$ . If  $b_k^* = b_j$  for some j < k, put  $a_k^* = a_j^*$ . Otherwise we choose  $a_k^*$  to be some element of A bearing the same order relations to  $a_0^*$ , ...,  $a_{k-1}^*$  as does  $b_k^*$  to  $b_0^*$ , ...,  $b_{k-1}^*$ . Again such an element can always be found.

This completes our recursive definition. We now define  $h: A \to B$  by putting  $h(a_n^*) = b_n^*$  for each  $n \in \omega$ . Clearly *h* is an isomorphism between  $(A, \leq)$  and  $(B, \leq)$ .

The theory we consider next is most naturally formulated in a language with *operation symbols*: all our previous results extend naturally to theories in such languages.

The *language*  $\mathcal{F}$  for fields is a first-order language with constant symbols 0, 1 and binary operation symbols +,  $\cdot$ . The *theory* **FT** of fields has the following postulates (where we write *xy* for  $x \cdot y$ ):

 $\forall x \forall y [(x + y) + z = x + (y + z)]$   $\forall x [x + 0 = x]$   $\forall x \forall y [x + y = y + x]$   $\forall x \exists y [x + y = 0]$   $\forall x \forall y \forall z [(xy)z = x(yz)]$   $\forall x [1x = x]$   $\forall x \forall y [xy = yx]$   $\forall x \forall y \forall x [(y + z) = xy + xz]$  $\neg (0 = 1).$ 

For  $p \in \omega$ , write p1 for 1 + 1 + ... + 1 with p summands. If to the postulates of **FT** we add the infinite set of sentences

$$\{\neg (p1 = 0): p \in \omega\},\$$

we get the *theory*  $\mathbf{FT}_0$  of fields of characteristic 0. (Natural examples are the fields of rationals and reals.)

We now write  $x^n$  for the expression  $x \cdot (x \cdot (... \cdot (x \cdot x)...)$  with *n* factors. The infinite list of sentences, for  $n \ge 1$ ,

$$\forall x_0 \dots \forall x_n [\neg (x_n = 0) \rightarrow \exists y (x_n y^n + x_{n-1} y^{n-1} + \dots + x_1 y + x_0 = 0)]$$

when added to the postulates of  $FT_0$ , yields the *theory*  $ACF_0$  of algebraically closed fields of characteristic 0. Each new postulate asserts that all polynomials of a given degree *n* has a zero.

We observe that  $ACF_0$  is *not*  $\aleph_0$ -categorical. For the field  $\mathbf{F}$  of algebraic numbers and the algebraic closure of the field  $\mathbf{F}[\pi]$  obtained by adjoining the transcendental  $\pi$  to  $\mathbf{F}$  are countable nonisomorphic models of  $ACF_0$ . On the other hand, a classical theorem of Steinitz asserts that  $ACF_0$  is  $\kappa$  -categorical for any *uncountable*  $\kappa$ , so we conclude from Vaught's test that  $ACF_0$  *is complete* Since the field  $\mathbb{C}$  of complex numbers is a model of  $ACF_0$ , it follows that  $ACF_0$  *is a set of postulates for the theory of*  $\mathbb{C}$ .

#### 8. The elementary chain theorem and some of its consequences.

Let  $\mathfrak{A}_0 \subseteq \mathfrak{A}_1 \subseteq ...$  be a chain of  $\mathscr{G}$ -structures: in particular the  $\mathfrak{A}_i$  all have the same designated elements. The *union* of the chain is the structure  $\mathfrak{A} = \bigcup_{n \in \omega} \mathfrak{A}_n$  defined as follows. The

domain of  $\mathfrak{A}$  is the set  $A = \bigcup_{n \in \omega} A_n$ . For  $i \in I$ , the *i*<sup>th</sup> relation  $R_i$  of  $\mathfrak{A}$  is the union of the corresponding *i*<sup>th</sup> relations of the  $A_n$ . The designated elements of  $\mathfrak{A}$  are the designated elements of the  $\mathfrak{A}_n$ . Clearly each  $\mathfrak{A}_n$  is a substructure of  $\mathfrak{A}$ .

A chain of structures  $\mathfrak{A}_0 \subseteq \mathfrak{A}_1 \subseteq ...$  in which each  $\mathfrak{A}_n$  is an elementary substructure of  $\mathfrak{A}_{n+1}$  is called an *elementary chain*. In this case we write  $\mathfrak{A}_0 \prec \mathfrak{A}_1 \prec ...$ .

**Elementary Chain Theorem.** Each member of an elementary chain of structures is an elementary substructure of the union of the chain.

**Proof.** Let  $\mathfrak{A}_0 \prec \mathfrak{A}_1 \prec ...$  be an elementary chain, and let  $\mathfrak{A}$  be its union. We prove the following assertion by induction on the degree of a formula: for any  $\mathscr{D}$ -formula  $\varphi(v_0, ..., v_n)$ , any  $n \in \omega$  and any  $a_0, ..., a_m \in A_n$ ,

(\*)  $\mathfrak{A}_n \vDash \varphi[a_0, ..., a_m] \Leftrightarrow \mathfrak{A} \vDash \varphi[a_0, ..., a_m].$ 

The proof is routine for atomic formulas, and the induction steps for  $\neg$  and  $\land$  are easy. Now suppose that  $\varphi$  is existential; without loss of generality we may assume that  $\varphi$  is  $\exists v_n \psi$ , and that  $\psi$  satisfies (\*).

If  $a_0, ..., a_{m-1} \in A_n$  and  $\mathfrak{A}_n \models \varphi[a_0, ..., a_{m-1}]$ , then for some  $a \in A_n$  we have  $\mathfrak{A}_n \models \psi[a_0, ..., a_{m-1}, a]$ . So by (\*)  $\mathfrak{A} \models \psi[a_0, ..., a_{m-1}, a]$  whence  $\mathfrak{A} \models \varphi[a_0, ..., a_{m-1}]$ .

Conversely, suppose that  $\mathfrak{A} \models \varphi[a_0, ..., a_{m-1}]$ . Then  $\mathfrak{A} \models \psi[a_0, ..., a_{m-1}, a]$  for some  $a \in A$ . For some  $k, a \in A_k$ . Let  $\ell$  be the larger of k and n. Then  $a_0, ..., a_{m-1}$ ,  $a \in A_\ell$  and so, by (\*),  $\mathfrak{A}_\ell \models \psi[a_0, ..., a_{m-1}, a]$ , whence  $\mathfrak{A}_\ell \models \varphi[a_0, ..., a_{m-1}]$ . But  $n \leq \ell$  and so, since  $\mathfrak{A}_n \prec \mathfrak{A}_\ell$ , we conclude that  $\mathfrak{A}_n \models \varphi[a_0, ..., a_{m-1}]$ .

We use this in the proof of the

**Joint Consistency Theorem.** Let  $\Sigma$  and  $\Pi$  be theories in  $\mathscr{G}$ , and let  $\mathscr{E}$  be the language whose extralogical symbols are those common to  $\mathscr{G}_{\Sigma}$  and  $\mathscr{G}_{\Pi}$ . Then the following are equivalent:

(i)  $\Sigma \cup \Pi$  is consistent.;

(ii) for no  $\mathscr{E}$ -sentence  $\sigma$  do we have  $\Sigma \vdash \sigma$  and  $\Pi \vdash \neg \sigma$ ;

(iii) for some complete (consistent) theory  $\Delta$  in  $\mathcal{E}$ , both  $\Sigma \cup \Delta$  and  $\Pi \cup \Delta$  are consistent;

(iv) there is an  $\mathscr{E}$ -structure which can be expanded both to a model of  $\Sigma$  and to a model of

П.

**Proof.** (i)  $\Rightarrow$  (ii) is obvious.

(ii)  $\Rightarrow$  (iii). Assume (ii) and let  $\Sigma^* = \{ \sigma \in Sent(\mathscr{E}): \Sigma \vdash \sigma \}$ . It follows easily from (ii) that  $\Pi \cup \Sigma^*$  is consistent and so has a model  $\mathfrak{A}$ . Let  $\Delta$  be the theory of the  $\mathscr{E}$ -structure  $\mathfrak{A} \mid \mathscr{E}$ . Since  $\mathfrak{A} \models \Pi \cup \Delta$ ,  $\Pi \cup \Delta$  is consistent. If  $\Sigma \cup \Delta$  is inconsistent, there is  $\sigma \in \Delta$  such that  $\Sigma \vdash \neg \sigma$ , i.e.  $\neg \sigma \in \Sigma^*$ . But then  $\mathfrak{A} \models \neg \sigma$ , whence  $\neg \sigma \in \Delta$ , a contradiction. Hence  $\Sigma \cup \Delta$  is consistent.

(iii)  $\Rightarrow$  (iv). Assume (iii), and let  $\mathfrak{A}_0$  and  $\mathfrak{B}_0$  be models of  $\Sigma \cup \Delta$  and  $\Pi \cup \Delta$ , respectively. Then since  $\mathfrak{A}_0 | \mathscr{E}$  and  $\mathfrak{B}_0 | \mathscr{E}$  are both models of the complete theory  $\Delta$ , they are elementarily equivalent. It follows easily from this that the union  $\Gamma$  of the complete diagram  $\Gamma^*$  of  $\mathfrak{A}_0 | \mathscr{E}$  with the complete diagram  $\Gamma^{**}$  of  $\mathfrak{B}_0$  is consistent. (Observe that each finite subset of  $\Gamma^*$  is interpretable in  $\mathfrak{B}_0$ .) Let  $\mathfrak{B}^*$  be a model of  $\Gamma$  and let  $\mathfrak{B}_1$  be its  $\mathscr{D}$ -reduction. Then since  $\mathfrak{B}^*$  is a model of both  $\Gamma^*$  and  $\Gamma^{**}$  it follows from the diagram lemma that  $\mathfrak{A}_0 | \mathscr{E} \preceq \mathfrak{B}_1 | \mathscr{E}$  and  $\mathfrak{B}_0 \preceq \mathfrak{B}_1$ . Identifying  $\mathfrak{B}_0$  with its image in  $\mathfrak{B}_1$  makes the former an elementary substructure of the latter. Let  $f_1$  be an elementary embedding of  $\mathfrak{A}_0 | \mathscr{E}$  into  $\mathfrak{B}_1 | \mathscr{E}$ .

Passing to the extended language  $\mathscr{E}_{A_0}$ , the diagram lemma implies that the structures  $(\mathfrak{A}_0 | \mathscr{E}, A_0) = (\mathfrak{A}_0, A_0) | \mathscr{E}_{A_0}$  and  $(\mathfrak{B}_1 | \mathscr{E}, f_1[A_0]) = (\mathfrak{B}_1, f_1[A_0])$  are elementarily equivalent. Repeating the above construction in the other direction, this time with the  $\mathscr{L}_{A_0}$ -structures  $(\mathfrak{A}_0, A_0)$  and  $(\mathfrak{B}_1, f_1[A_0])$  in place of  $\mathfrak{A}_0, \mathfrak{B}_0$ , respectively, we obtain an elementary extension  $\mathfrak{A}_1$  of  $\mathfrak{A}_0$  and an elementary embedding  $g_1$  of  $(\mathfrak{B}_1, f_1[A_0]) | \mathscr{E}_{A_0}$  into  $(\mathfrak{A}_1, A_0) | \mathscr{E}_{A_0}$ . Then  $g \circ f_1$  is the identity on  $A_0$ , so that  $f_1 \subseteq g_1^{-1}$ .

Iterating this construction yields a diagram

$$\mathfrak{A}_0 \prec \mathfrak{A}_1 \prec \mathfrak{A}_2 \prec \dots$$
  
 $f_1 \mathfrak{B}_1 \mathfrak{B}_2 \mathfrak{B}_2 \prec \mathfrak{B}_1 \prec \mathfrak{B}_2 \prec \dots$ 

such that, for each  $m, f_m$  is an elementary embedding of  $\mathfrak{A}_{m-1} | \mathscr{E}$  into  $\mathfrak{B}_m | \mathscr{E}, g_m$  is an elementary embedding of  $\mathfrak{B}_m | \mathscr{E}$  into  $\mathfrak{A}_m | \mathscr{E}$ , and  $f_m \subseteq g_m^{-1} \subseteq f_{m+1}$ . Let  $\mathfrak{A}$  and  $\mathfrak{B}$  be the unions of the elementary chains  $\mathfrak{A}_0 \prec \mathfrak{A}_1 \prec ...$  and  $\mathfrak{B}_0 \prec \mathfrak{B}_1 \prec ...$  respectively. Then, by the elementary chain theorem,  $\mathfrak{A}$  is a model of  $\Sigma$  and  $\mathfrak{B}$  is a model of  $\Pi$ . Moreover,  $\bigcup_{m \in \varpi} f_m$  is an isomorphism of  $\mathfrak{A} | \mathscr{E}$ and  $\mathfrak{B} | \mathscr{E}$  (since, by construction, it has inverse  $\bigcup_{m \in \varpi} g_m$ . It follows that  $\mathfrak{B}$  is isomorphic to a structure  $\mathfrak{B}'$  such that  $\mathfrak{A} | \mathscr{E} = \mathfrak{B}' | \mathscr{E}$ . Accordingly the  $\mathscr{E}$ -structure  $\mathfrak{A} | \mathscr{E}$  can be expanded both to the model  $\mathfrak{A}$  of  $\Sigma$  and to the model  $\mathfrak{B}'$  of  $\Pi$ .

(iv)  $\Rightarrow$  (i). Let  $\mathfrak{A}$  be an  $\mathscr{E}$ -structure expandable both to a model  $\mathfrak{B}$  of  $\Sigma$  and to a model  $\mathfrak{C}$  of  $\Pi$ . Define the  $\mathscr{L}$ -structure  $\mathfrak{D}$  as follows: the domain of  $\mathfrak{D}$  is that of  $\mathfrak{A}$ ; if *s* is any extralogical symbol of  $\mathscr{L}$ , then

$$s^{\mathfrak{D}} = \begin{bmatrix} s^{\mathfrak{A}} & \text{if } s \in \mathscr{E} \\ s^{\mathfrak{B}} & \text{if } s \in \mathscr{L} - \mathscr{L}_{\Pi} \\ s^{\mathfrak{C}} & \text{if } s \in \mathscr{L}_{\Pi} \end{bmatrix}$$

Clearly  $\mathfrak{D} \mid \mathscr{G}_{\Sigma} = \mathfrak{B}$ , so  $\mathfrak{D} \models \Sigma$ . Also,  $\mathfrak{D} \mid \mathscr{G}_{\Pi} = \mathfrak{C}$ , so  $\mathfrak{D} \models \Pi$ . Therefore  $\mathfrak{D}$  is a model of  $\Sigma \cup \Pi$ , so the latter is consistent.

From this we deduce

**Craig's Interpolation Theorem**. Suppose  $\sigma$ ,  $\tau$  are  $\mathscr{D}$ -sentences and  $\vdash \sigma \rightarrow \tau$ . Then there is a sentence  $\theta$  such that  $\vdash \sigma \rightarrow \theta$ ,  $\vdash \theta \rightarrow \tau$ , and every extralogical symbol occurring in  $\theta$  occurs in both  $\sigma$  and  $\tau$ .

**Proof.** Let  $\mathscr{E}$  be the language whose extralogical symbols are exactly those occurring in both  $\sigma$  and  $\tau$ . If  $\vdash \sigma \rightarrow \tau$ , then  $\{\sigma, \neg\tau\}$  is inconsistent, so by (ii) of the joint consistency theorem there is an  $\mathscr{E}$ -sentence  $\theta$  such that  $\sigma \vdash \theta$  and  $\neg\tau \vdash \neg\theta$ . The result now follows immediately.

Suppose that  $\Sigma \subseteq Sent(\mathscr{G})$  contains the *n*-ary predicate symbol *P*. *P* is said to be *explicitly definable* from  $\Sigma$  if there is an  $\mathscr{G}$ -formula  $\varphi(x_1, ..., x_n)$ , *in which P does not occur*, such that

 $\Sigma \vdash \forall x_1 \dots \forall x_n [Px_1 \dots x_n \leftrightarrow \varphi].$ 

Now let  $P^*$  be an *n*-ary predicate symbol *not* belonging to  $\mathscr{D}$ , and let  $\Sigma^*$  be the set of sentences obtained from  $\Sigma$  by replacing all occurrences of *P* by *P*<sup>\*</sup>. Then *P* is said to be *implicitly definable* from  $\Sigma$  if

$$\Sigma \cup \Sigma^* \vdash \forall x_1 ... \forall x_n [Px_1 ... x_n \leftrightarrow P^* x_1 ... x_n].$$

Semantically speaking, this means that any pair of  $\mathscr{D}$ -structures which are both models of  $\Sigma$ , have the same domain and agree on the interpretation of all extralogical symbols apart possibly from *P*, must also agree on the interpretation of *P*.

Clearly, if *P* is explicitly definable from  $\Sigma$ , it is implicitly definable from  $\Sigma$ . Conversely, we have

**Beth's Definability Theorem.** If *P* is implicitly definable from  $\Sigma$ , it is explicitly definable from  $\Sigma$ .

**Proof.** Suppose *P* is implicitly definable from  $\Sigma$ . Without loss of generality we may assume  $\Sigma$  to be finite, and we can then replace  $\Sigma$  by the conjunction of all its sentences. So we may assume that  $\Sigma$  consists of a single sentence  $\sigma$ . Let  $\sigma^*$  be the result of replacing each occurrence of *P* in  $\sigma$  by *P*<sup>\*</sup>. Then we have

(1) 
$$\{\sigma, \sigma^*\} \vdash \forall x_1 \dots \forall x_n [Px_1 \dots x_n \to P^*x_1 \dots x_n].$$

Now add new constant symbols  $c_1,...,c_n$  to  $\mathscr{L}$  Then, by (1),

$$\{\sigma, \sigma^*\} \vdash Pc_1...c_n \to P^*c_1...c_n.$$

So

$$\vdash \sigma \land Pc_1...c_n \to (\sigma^* \to P^*c_1...c_n).$$

By Craig's theorem, there is a sentence  $\theta$  whose extralogical symbols are common to both  $\sigma \wedge Pc_1...c_n$  and  $\sigma^* \rightarrow P^*c_1...c_n$ , hence, in particular, not containing *P* or *P*\* such that  $\vdash \sigma \wedge Pc_1...c_n \rightarrow \theta$  and  $\vdash \theta \rightarrow (\sigma^* \rightarrow P^*c_1...c_n)$ .

(2) 
$$\sigma \vdash Pc_{1}...c_{n} \rightarrow \theta$$

(3) 
$$\sigma^* \vdash \theta \to P^*c_1...c_n$$

If we replace  $P^*$  by P in (3),  $\sigma^*$  becomes  $\sigma$  and  $\theta$  is unchanged. So

(4)  $\sigma \vdash \theta \to Pc_1...c_n.$ 

(2) and (4) now give

(5) 
$$\Sigma \vdash \theta \leftrightarrow Pc_{1...}c_{n}$$

But  $\theta$  is  $\varphi(c_1,...,c_n)$  for some  $\mathscr{L}$ -formula  $\varphi(x_1,...,x_n)$  in which P does not occur. Since  $c_1,...,c_n$ 

are not in  $\mathscr{D}$ , the result of replacing  $c_i$  by  $x_i$  (i = 1, ..., n) in the proof from  $\Sigma$  of  $\theta \leftrightarrow Pc_1...c_n$ yields a proof from  $\Sigma$  of  $\phi \leftrightarrow Px_1...x_n$ . Applying the generalization lemma gives  $\Sigma \vdash \forall x_1...\forall x_n [\phi \leftrightarrow Px_1...x_n]$ 

and so *P* is explicitly definable from  $\Sigma$ .